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Th e most plastic of all things is the human mind, and next aft er that comes the 
organic world, the world of protoplasm. Now the generalizing tendency is the 
great law of mind, the law of association, the law of habit taking. We also fi nd in 
all active protoplasm a tendency to take habits. Hence I was led to the hypothesis 
that the laws of the universe have been formed under a universal tendency of all 
things toward generalization and habit-taking. (1898, CP 7.515)2
It may fairly be urged that since the phenomena of habit may thus result from a 
purely mechanical arrangement, it is unnecessary to suppose that habit-taking is 
a primordial principle of the universe. (1892, CP 6.262)3
[...] and since knowledge is habit [...]. (1906, CP 4.531)4
Th is brief essay is a refl ection on and appreciation of the thorough work collected 
and edited by Donna E. West and Myrdene Anderson entitled Consensus on Peirce’s 
Concept of Habit: Before and Beyond Consciousness (2016) on the phenomenon and 
concept of habit through the interpretation of the legacy of Charles S. Peirce.
Semiotics is not yet completed. Semiotics – whose role is to serve with fundamental 
theories and methods of all sciences that study knowing and meaning-making in all 
their forms (including the primitive forms of semiosis ever since life emerged) – has 
a long history; however, as an institutionalized fi eld it is only a half a century old. 
Habits of this science are not yet taught in many schools, and they are not ready either. 
1 Author’s address: Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu, Jakobi 2, Tartu 51014, 
Estonia; e-mail: kalevi.kull@ut.ee.
2 See also Santaella 2016 and Sonesson 2016 in the volume of West and Anderson, as well as 
Kull 2014, who all comment on this passage.
3 See also comments in Houser 2010: lxxxix.
4 See comments in Kilpinen 2015: 167–168.
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Semiotics experiences its youthfulness. Accordingly, our part is pleasure and pain, 
ours an era of fascinating insights and discoveries in semiotics – as well as changes 
in views, or hard work and tiresome discussions. No concept is protected against re-
interpretation. 
Habit is a fundamental concept for semiotics; at least the development of semiotics 
demonstrates it is becoming one. It already was one in the thought of Peirce,5 and for 
that reason an inquiry into his work is a signifi cant part of semiotics.
Th e development of the concept of habit has much to teach to us.6 For instance, 
it was important in the discussions of evolution and development in Peirce’s times. 
Speaking of the Law of Habit, Joseph John Murphy, in Habit and Intelligence, says that 
“all vital actions whatever tend to repeat themselves, and consequently to become 
habitual”; he also speaks about three main types of habits: formative, motor, and 
mental habits, mentioning that “the law of mental habit is usually called the law of 
association of ideas” (Murphy 1869: 48). As Conwy Lloyd Morgan states in Habit 
and Instinct, “habit [...] involves individual acquisition” (Morgan 1896: 17). Or, as 
Samuel Butler observes in Life and Habit, “unconscious knowledge and unconscious 
volition are never acquired otherwise than as a result of experience, familiarity, 
or habit” (Butler 1878: 18). James Mark Baldwin (1906: 452) adds, concerning an 
organism’s development, “[F]irst, it develops by getting habits formed; and second, it 
develops by getting new adaptations which involve the breaking up or modifi cation 
of habits – these latter being called accommodations”. In Peirce’s system, habit takes a 
most fundamental place. All these scholars were important as regards the formation 
of the understanding of evolution on the basis of ‘organic selection’, or ‘the Baldwinian 
mechanism’, that today is known as a part of the Post-Darwinian, or epigenetic account 
of organic evolution.7 
And this is not all. When the social aspect of habit is brought into a focus, a line 
of development of this concept appears which leads from Peirce’s habit via Erwin 
Panofsky to Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus (see Viola 2012).8 Yet another dimension of 
habit is related to moral decisions and ethics (see, e.g., Colapietro 2011).
How is diversifi cation possible in the world? Th is was one of the central problems 
Peirce attempted to solve. However, it appears to have been a little too early for a 
scientifi cally well-argued answer to be formulated. Anyhow, modelling of habit is a 
5 Cf. Pietarinen (2015: 378): “It turns out that at least experience and habit, two cornerstones 
of Peirce’s thought, do not fall under the umbrella of signs. Every sign has its representative 
quality, its meaning. Meaning, in turn, is a habit, and it is derived from experience.” 
6 E.g, the use of the concept of habit already by David Hume, or in later psychology 
(Roeckelein 1998: 224–225).
7 Also called Extended Synthesis, or semiotic theory of evolution; on this, see Kull 2016.
8 In this respect, see also Nöth 2016 and Sonesson 2016 in the volume of West and Anderson.
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constituent of the problem of diversifi cation. Th eoretical semiotics has a long way to 
go, and this is kept in mind in the formulations that follow.
The semiotic concept of habit
Habits are regularities that are products of semiosis. Any habit is a regularity produced 
by semiosis. Th e process involved in habit-change is learning. Learning modifi es 
habits and establishes new ones. Habits presuppose learning. Th us habits carry on 
one’s experience. 
Semiotics is a fundamental fi eld of (study of) knowing – and habits are necessary 
for any knowing. Even more – as Peirce said, “knowledge is habit” (CP 4.531).
Jaakko Hintikka (2007: 17) added, “Surely the fi rst order of business of any genuine 
theory of knowledge – the most important task both theoretically and practically – 
is how new [knowledge can be] acquired, not merely how previously obtained 
information can be evaluated”.
As Erkki Kilpinen (2015: 160) has said, habits are “vehicles of cognition”. With a 
reference to John Dewey, Kilpinen (2015: 160) also states that “intentionality without 
habituality is empty, habituality without intentionality is blind”.9
What exactly is the relationship between semiosis and habit? Or rather, in the 
plural – semioses and habits (since sign is never single). Do habits include semioses 
or does semiosis always precede habit?
Th e formula ‘habits – semioses – habits’ can be used as a simple representation 
of the dynamic relationship. Semiosis occurs due to certain incompatibility in the 
interaction of habits, thus it requires habits. As a result of semioses, habits will change, 
or new habits appear. 
It is reasonable to hypothesize that semiosis takes place only in a phenomenal 
present (in specious present, as William James used the term).10 Or rather semiosis 
creates the phenomenal present, the now. (We can even say that semiosis is the 
phenomenal now.) Th is is because interpretation assumes a possibility for choice 
(between options), while choice truly cannot happen in a sequentionality, it presumes 
presence and the present. In this aspect, semiosis is a choice between habits. Habits 
themselves are sequential behaviours. 
Habits are inferences carried out by life far before logic becomes conscious or 
formal. Not only is habit repeated (almost automatic) behaviour; habit may also be 
repeated semiosis. 
9 Cf. Dewey (1922: 67): “Th ought which does not exist within ordinary habits of action lacks 
means of execution”. Cf. also comments in Glăveanu 2014 about ‘habitual creativity’.
10 More on this in Kull 2015.
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Th e regularity of habits is based on scaff oldings (Hoff meyer 2014). Th e scaff oldings, 
however, are modifi ed by habits themselves. 
Habit is always a construing. Th us, it is a basis for creativity (Glăveanu 2014). 
Almost paradoxically, the force of habit works as vis vitalis. 
Consensus on Peirce’s concept of habit?
Donna West and Myrdene Anderson have compiled and edited a book that can 
be described as a collective monograph on, and also a companion to, the Peircean 
approach to the phenomenon of habit. As far as I know, this book constitutes the fi rst 
treatment of Peirce’s unique concept of habit.
Th e editors of this volume are professional semioticians whose impact on con-
temporary semiotics has been remarkable (e.g., Anderson et al. 1984; 2003; Adams, 
Anderson 1994; Anderson, Merrell 1991; Anderson 2004, 2016a; West 2014). Th ey 
have done marvellous work in carefully uniting the eff orts of 27 semioticians from 12 
countries: USA (7), Italy (3), Brazil (3), Finland (3), Germany (2), UK (2), Estonia (2), 
Sweden (1), Denmark (1), Norway (1), Mexico (1), Uruguay (1).
Th e book includes 23 chapters: the Preamble by Anderson, the Epilogue by West, 
and 6+7+8 articles, divided into three parts. An appendix includes a brief glossary of 
some of Peirce’s terms. Th e list of authors is impressive. Part I (Background: Eco-logical 
Systems) includes the contributions of Dinda L. Gorlée, Winfried Nöth, John Coletta, 
Stanley N. Salthe, John Pickering, Pedro Atã and João Queiroz. Part II (Habit as Action 
Schema) consist of chapters by Juuso-Ville Gustafsson and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, 
Atocha Aliseda, Lucia Santaella, Mats Bergman, Erkki Kilpinen, Donna E. West, and 
Frederik Stjernfelt. Part III (Mental Complexions of Habit) contains writings by Ahti-
Veikko Pietarinen and Francesco Bellucci, Göran Sonesson, Vincent Colapietro, Sara 
Cannizzaro and Myrdene Anderson, Fernando Andacht, Lorenzo Magnani, Selene 
Arfi ni and Tommaso Bertolotti, Nathan Houser, Elize Bisanz and Scott Cunningham. 
From its title, Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit, one may assume that the 
volume assuredly states the consolidation and settledness of Peirce’s approach in 
semiotics. Indeed, one can say that the last decade has shown the possibility of arriving at 
a productive agreement in the interpretation of the core of Peirce’s theory (in this respect 
I would particularly like to emphasize the work of Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Francesco 
Bellucci, Nathan Houser, Vincent Colapietro). Th is impression should be still kept apart 
from an association with a fi nal consensus that is obviously impossible in case of Peirce. 
Th e book is rich in fresh ideas and fi ne formulations. For illustration, a few hints 
in the form of quotations. 
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Myrdene Anderson (2016b: 8): “Understanding “self ” as a manifestation of a 
bundle of habits, implicates “self-control” as a player. It happens that contemporary 
research in the social and behavioural sciences seems to back into the study of self-
control, though seldom via Peirce’s insights. [...] Probably no single angle of habit 
will turn out to be so signifi cant to the contemporary world as self-control.” Indeed, 
the topic of self-control is discussed in the papers by Gorlée, Nöth, Gustafsson and 
Pietarinen, Santaella, Bergman, Kilpinen, West, Stjernfelt. Pietarinen and Bellucci, 
Colapietro, Cannizzaro and Anderson, in this volume about habit.
Dinda Gorlée (2016: 31): “Habits show clear signs of improvement during each 
year of Peirce’s early work. [...] Th e original word habit comes from Aristotle’s right 
and wrong behavior, but transfi gured by Peirce into the term of acquired (learned) 
habits as inferior sign to Th irdness.” An exact synopsis. 
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Francesco Bellucci (2016: 265): “Th e logical represen-
tative interpretant is a principle not itself a premise, a rule not itself subject to rules, a 
habit not itself a sign.” A habit may not be a sign.
It is important to keep the concept of habit separated from the concept of physical 
law. Habit is a locally acquired regularity, a rule of behaviour with its exceptions. By 
defi nition, a physical law is, in contrast, universal, without exceptions, not acquired. 
Th e excellent volume by Donna West and Myrdene Anderson about the concept 
of habit is a part of the collective work on the conceptual apparatus of semiotics that 
semiotic science systematically has to engage in and accomplish. 
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